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Vehicular Ad Hoc Network (VANET) allows vehicles to exchange information
about road and traffic conditions through wireless communications. Nevertheless,
providing reliable and authenticated information without violating the user’s
privacy seems contradictory.
In this paper, we propose an Anonymous
Announcement System especially designed for Electric Vehicle (EV) in VANETs to
achieve the aforementioned contradictory goals. We demonstrated the feasibility
of the protocol with a prototype implementation on a suitable device and a
network simulation with our protocol added on top of a normal VANET.
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1.
1.1.

INTRODUCTION
VANET

A Vehicular Ad-Hoc Network (VANET) is a technology
that allows moving cars as nodes to form an ad-hoc
network. In a VANET, every car can be a router or
a node. It allows other vehicles to connect and route
through data. A network for wide area can be formed.
It is ad-hoc, in the sense that cars can move out from
the single range and drop out of the network, while
other cars can join. All connecting vehicles then form
a Mobile Ad-Hoc Network (MANET).
VANETs can further provide traffic optimization [31,
35, 46, 12]. Vehicles can serve as data collectors. They
can transmit the traffic condition information, such as
the number of neighbours and their mean velocities.
Within the infrastructure of VANETs, privacy and
security are the two major challenges especially if
VANET acts as a source of (traffic) information . No
driver wants to broadcast his/her real identity and
current location while in contrast, authentication is
required at the same time. Otherwise, one may send
some wrong messages or impersonate others to send
messages. There are many schemes in the literature
(such as [45, 19, 18, 44]) that deal with these two

seeming contradictory requirements.
Chen et al. [11] addressed the problem of reliability
of information exchange between vehicles. Consider the
case in their scenario when a car driver Bob receives
a message from another vehicle reporting some traffic
jam a few miles away. He may not have any idea
whether the message is true or not. At the beginning, he
attempts to ignore it. But shortly after that he receives
several messages (say n) reporting the same traffic jam.
If this number n is a reasonably large number and
these messages are sent by n different vehicles, this
information is likely to be true, as it seems unlikely
that any n vehicles would collude to lie. However, if all
these messages are sent anonymously due to privacy
concern, how can Bob find out whether n received
messages are sent by n different legitimate vehicles
without discovering the identities of these vehicles? The
scenario is illustrated in Figure 1. The authors proposed
a solution using Threshold Anonymous Announcement
(TAA) service.
TAA allows every vehicle to obtain a token from
a trusted party. One may broadcast an anonymous
message to other vehicles signed by this token so that
any recipient of this broadcast message may know
that it is from a legitimate vehicle yet the identity is
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FIGURE 1: Threshold Anonymous Announcement service

unknown. At the same time, TAA provides linkability.
That is, if a vehicle sends the same message twice, the
receiver will be able to know these two messages are
sent by the same vehicle. Hence, it is easy to distinguish
whether n messages are from n different vehicles.
Their solution can satisfy some of the security
requirements, namely reliability (the announcement was
issued by a legitimate source without unauthorized
modification); privacy (a broadcast message cannot be
bound to its source and different messages from one
source cannot be linked to each other); and auditability
(if a source is defective or malicious, it can be identified
and rejected). However, the verifier in the system
cannot ensure that the sender is actually at the claimed
position. It uses the simple threshold technique to
determine the accuracy. That is, if the number of
announcements of the event reaches the predetermined
threshold, the verifier believes that the reported event
is true and takes appropriate action.
1.2.

Electric Vehicle

Electric vehicles (EVs) are propelled by an electric
motor (or motors) powered by rechargeable battery
packs. Electric motors have several advantages over
internal combustion engines (ICEs). Electric motors
convert 75% of the chemical energy from the batteries
to power the wheels while internal combustion engines
(ICEs) only convert 20% of the energy stored in
gasoline. Besides, EVs emit no tailpipe pollutants,
although the power plant producing the electricity may
emit them. Electricity from hydro, solar, or windpowered plants causes no air pollutants which in turn

becomes re-usable energy.
Despite their potential benefits, widespread adoption
of EVs faces several hurdles and limitations. One of
the major problems is the driving range. Most EVs
can only go at most 150 km before recharging, while
gasoline vehicles can go at least 500 km before refueling.
One of the solutions is to install more fast charging
stations with high-speed charging capability so that
consumers could recharge the 100 km battery of their
electric vehicle to 80 percent in about 30 minutes.
1.3.

EV in VANETs: The Advantage

The shortcoming of EV is not really bad. We try
to turn it into an advantage. Although the frequent
charging process may reveal the location information
of the EV, on the opposite side, the charging station
can authenticate the location of the EV. In the scenario
described in Section 1.1, the location of each car is
not authenticated. The car in location A (pretending
it is in location B) may send a message telling others
about the traffic condition in location B. Definitely it is
not accurate. However, other drivers can do nothing
to check the authenticity of the location message.
One may use a GPS to provide location information
embedded in the message. Nevertheless, without any
authentication, the driver may provide a false GPS data
instead of the real one. For EV, the charging station
provides an excellent way to authenticate the current
time and location of the car. The car may get an
authenticated token from the charging station, proving
that it is within a specific location at a particular
time. It then uses this token to sign the current traffic
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condition and broadcasts to other vehicles. In this
way, the accuracy of the whole system can be greatly
improved. Details of the idea will be given in Section
3.2.
1.4.

Our Contribution

We propose a solution called Anonymous Announcement System (AAS) for Electric Vehicle in VANETs.
Our system can be regarded as the enhanced version of
TAA [11]. In addition to the basic features provided
in TAA, we also allow an EV to broadcast a message
telling nearby vehicles about the current traffic condition. Simultaneously our system protects the privacy of
the sender. In general, our system satisfies the following
security features:
1.

2.

3.

4.

Entity Authentication with Data Integrity:
If a vehicle accepts a reported event, the
announcement was issued by a legitimate source
without unauthorized modification.
Location and Time Authentication: The
location of the sender was authenticated by the
charging station. That is, the receiver can ensure
that the sender was within a particular location at
a specific time.
Privacy: A broadcast message cannot be linked to
its source, and different messages from one source
authenticated by different charging stations cannot
be linked to each other.
Accuracy: Upon receiving a message, the receiver
uses a two dimensional formula to calculate the
accuracy of the message: if the authenticated
location is farther, the accuracy of this message
is lower. Similarly, the longer the authenticated
time, the lower the accuracy is. The receiver may
receive a number of messages and calculates the
overall accuracy based on these two factors.

Furthermore, our system is also compatible with
non electric vehicles. Without giving any information
about the location and time, a message is regarded
as an unauthenticated message and the accuracy is
determined as medium. We introduce a special formula
to calculate the overall accuracy for a given set of
authenticated and unauthenticated messages.
When compared to the TAA, our system not only
provides an authenticated way for EV to broadcast
traffic condition message, the efficiency is also improved.
We allow vehicles (and charging stations) to use idle
time to do some pre-computations offline. When
it needs to signs a message, it can use the precomputed data to facilitate the sign process.
In
addition, different from the TAA, we do not require
any pairing operation in our whole system. Pairing is
an expensive computation operation which is believed
not to be suitable for lightweight and handheld devices.
Without pairing operation, our system can be easily
implemented in any portable devices or in-car-units.
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We would also like to remark that our proposal do
not achieve perfectly unlinkability. Roughly speaking,
the privacy offered by our scheme is falls between
pseudonymity and anonymity. The pseudonym is
chosen by the vehicle and cannot be deanonymised to
any user identifier. Furthermore, the user refreshes its
pseudonym each time it makes a new re-charge. Still,
messages sent by the same vehicle using between recharging are linkable. This is in contrast with TAA,
where messages are only linkable for the same event to
prevent a malicious node from injecting the messages
about the same event into the network multiple times.
2.

RELATED WORK

Many schemes have been proposed in the literature to
address the issues of authenticity, privacy and accuracy
with a variety of mechanisms, with different emphasis
and with varying degrees of success. Here we only focus
on research that is particularly relevant to these features
within a similar framework.
2.1.

Crytographyic Solutions

We briefly discuss various cryptographic primitives that
could be applied to this specific problem and discuss the
obstacles for their directly applications. They are not
employed in our system.
2.1.1. Credential System
An anonymous credential or pseudonymous system,
first introduced by Chaum [5], is a system in which
a user obtains a credential from an issuer and
demonstrates the possession of the credential to a
verifier who only has the public information of the
issuer. Apart from the fact of the user’s ownership of a
credential granted by an issuer, the verifier cannot get
the identity of the user, even if the verifier colludes with
the issuer.
There are two types of credential systems: the oneshow credential system and the multi-show credential
system.
Possession of a one-show credential can
only be demonstrated once.
Otherwise, it can
be detected or anonymity of the owner will be
compromised. Possession of a multi-show credential
can be demonstrated for an arbitrary number of times
without being linked and the anonymity of the owner
would not be compromised.
Camenisch and Lysyanskaya proposed the first
practical multi-show credential system [3].
Their
system allows a user to unlinkably demonstrate
possession of a credential as many times as necessary
without involving the issuer.
These credentials can be used to sign an announcement in VANETS [36, 2, 24, 14, 34, 22, 9] which guarantees authentication and data integrity. However, the
issue of distinguishability of origin may arise: are two
messages coming from two different sources or one single
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source? If a single vehicle is able to send multiple messages pretending to come from different sources, then it
would definitely influence the acceptance of announcements.

2.1.2. Ring Signature or Group Signature
Group signatures, introduced by Chaum and Heyst [6]
in 1991, allow group members to anonymously sign
arbitrary messages on behalf of the group. Verifiers do
not know who the actual signer is, but only the fact that
the signer is one of the members within the group. In
addition, signatures generated from the same signer are
unlinkable, that is, it is difficult to determine whether
two or more signatures were generated by the same
group member. In case of dispute, a group manager
will be able to open a signature and incontestably show
the identity of the signer. At the same time, no one will
be able to falsely accuse any other member of the group.
Group signatures may be used in VANETs to provide
anonymous authentication purposes [2, 24, 7, 25].
The ring signature concept introduced by Rivest,
Shamir, and Tauman [37] improves the privacy
preserving capability of group signatures by removing
the need for a group manager and allowing a signer
to create an ad-hoc group membership even without
the knowledge of the other members whose identities
and public keys she has used. Ring signature scheme is
an excellent primitive for use in applications with the
competing requirements of message authenticity and
signer privacy. It can also be used in VANETs to
provide privacy and authenticity [16, 8].
Nevertheless, similar to credentials, both primitives
cannot provide distinguishability of origin. A variant
of ring signature may solve this problem. Linkable
ring signature was first proposed by Liu et al. [27]
in 2004. In this notion, the identity of the signer
in a ring signature remains anonymous, but two ring
signatures can be linked if they are signed by the
same signer, no matter whether those two messages
are the same or different. Linkability is compulsorily
embedded into the signature instead of voluntarily
added in linkable ring signatures. If the signer refuses to
add the correct linking information, the whole signature
becomes invalid. In other words, linkability is enforced
by the verifier. The signer cannot decline to do so. This
variant provides an option to distinguish two messages
of origin: If they are from the same signer, they can be
linked.
However, using (linkable) ring signature in VANETs
may face another obstacle. How can the user know
the identities of nearby vehicles as it is a requirement
of ring signature? Assume there are 100 vehicles in a
congested area, without the help of any infrastructure,
it is impossible to know who is also being congested
in this area. That makes ring signature difficult to be
deployed in VANET announcement system.

2.2.

Anonymous Authentication Schemes for
Vehicular Networks

In the area of security and privacy of Vehicular Ad
Hoc Networks (VANETs), a number of research works
have been done on anonymous authentication to ensure
security and privacy. A majority of these schemes make
use of pseudonyms (e.g. [2, 45, 18]) or anonymous
credentials (e.g. [13, 15]). A recent approach is to
use signature-based technique (e.g. [24, 22, 43, 11,
42, 28]) to achieve anonymous authentication. All
these schemes are suitable for authorization in different
situations with different requirements and features. We
pick the one with most similar features with our scheme
for detail description.
2.2.1. Threshold Anonymous Announcement (TAA)
Threshold Anonymous Announcement (TAA) was
proposed by Chen et al. [11]. It uses direct anonymous
attestation and one-time anonymous authentication
to provide anonymous announcement system. The
accuracy was based on a threshold value: If a
vehicle receives more than n messages sent by n
different vehicles reporting the same traffic jam and
if n is reasonably large number, it is likely that the
information is true. The TAA system provides a
mechanism to ensure that if the receiver accepts the
reported event, those n messages are sent by n different
vehicles.
Although the accuracy can be determined by
the threshold value, there is no way to provide
authentication for the location of the sender. The
sender may pretend he is in location A while he is
actually in location B. There is no mechanism to
authenticate the location and time of a vehicle.
2.3.

Message Trustworthiness

The trustworthiness of the announcementin a VANET
has been studied extensively. Taking location into
consideration was studied in [20]. Specifically, Huang
et al. concluded that higher trust weighting should be
assigned to announcement made by nodes closer to the
event. The reason is that opinion of a node further away
from the reported event may actually be influenced by
the node closer to the event. Counting both opinion as
if they are independent report is known as the problem
of over-sampling. In their work, distance is measured
by the number of hops in the network. In another
dimension, Li et al. [23] proposed to a reputation-based
announcement system in which a central authority
maintain and keep track of the reputation of each node
so that vehicles could choose to trust messages coming
from nodes with a high reputation. Subsequently, Li
et al. [29] and Chen et al. [10] further enhances this
framework by providing privacy protection to the nodes.

Anonymous Announcement System (AAS) for Electric Vehicle in VANETs
3.
3.1.

OVERVIEW OF THE AAS SOLUTION
Infrastructure

In our system, there are a system issuer (or authority)
and two more entities: charging station and vehicle.
We will not assume the availability of any roadside
infrastructure.
The issuer is responsible to certify each charging
station. For the charging station, besides the normal
charging task, it is also responsible to issue a token
for the vehicle, which has embedded the current time
and the location information of the charging station.
The vehicle uses this token as the signing key, to sign
the traffic condition message and broadcasts to other
vehicles nearby. After receiving a signed message from
other vehicle, the vehicle calculates the accuracy of the
message based on the location and time issued for the
token. If the location is far away, of course the accuracy
should be lower. Similarly, if the issued time is long ago,
the accuracy should be also lower.
As the charging frequency for an EV is quite high (e.g.
several times a day), the vehicle can get an updated
token easily. The message signed by the current token
and the message signed by the previous token cannot
be linked, even though they are produced by the same
signer. This provides unlinkability and privacy to each
user. However, the messages produced by the same
token can be linked. This is to prevent a single user
sending n different messages pretending these messages
are sent by n different users. That is, it provides a mean
to distinguish the source of origin.
3.2.

Basic Idea

The basic idea of our AAS is similar to the TAA
system: we all rely on other vehicles to broadcast
anonymous traffic condition messages in VANETs. The
main difference is that. In the TAA scheme, the vehicle
is only authenticated for the eligibility to broadcast
the message. The accuracy of the message is solely
determined by the threshold value. There is nothing
related to the location and time. On the other side,
our AAS makes use of the property of EV, namely
the requirement to re-charge frequently, to provide an
authentication mechanism for the location and time of
the vehicle. Our system works as follow.
When an EV goes to re-charge, the charging station
gives a credential to it. The credential has embedded
the current location and time. Later when the EV
wants to broadcast a message about the current traffic
condition, it first signs the message with this credential
and broadcasts the message and signature pair to
other vehicles. When a nearby vehicle receives this
information, it first verifies the signature and calculates
its accuracy based on its authenticated location and
time.
We have an index called accuracy index which is used
to determine the accuracy of the message. We divide
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it into two parts. For the first part, we set the initial
value to be 1. If the authenticated location and the
reported location of the incident is near (e.g. within
10km), we multiply the accuracy index by 100%. If
the incident location is a bit far away (e.g. between
10km and 20km), we multiply the accuracy index by
80%, and so on. Similar mechanism will be done for
the authenticated time and the reported time of the
incident. If the time difference between the re-charging
and the reported incident is small (e.g. within 10
minutes), we multiply the accuracy index by 100%.
If the time difference is larger (e.g. within 10 to 20
minutes), we multiply the index by 80%, and so on.
Besides the location and time difference between the
re-charging and the reported incident, we also need
to take into account the location and time difference
between the reported incident and the receiver. It is
used to determine the second part of the accuracy index,
which is first initialized to be 1. We use similar formula
to calculate it as part one.
Finally we add up the index of part one and part
two. The score should be in between 0 and 2. If it is
near 0, that means it is not accurate and if it is near
2, that means it is very accurate. This is the accuracy
index from one vehicle. The concept of accuracy index
is illustrated in Figure 2.
We need to add up all accuracy indexes received
from other vehicles to determine the final accuracy.
If it is above a threshold value, the receiver believes
that it is true. This threshold value can be set by
the receiver dynamically. Note that our AAS can
be also compatible with non electric vehicles. If
the received information comes from a normal car
(without authenticated location and time), we can set
the accuracy index to be 1 (that is, in between very
accurate and very inaccurate).
3.3.

Adversarial Model

We will adhere to the model in which adversaries
constitute a relatively small fraction of the active
vehicles at any one time [17, 33]. The aim of an
adversary would be to make announcements that would
be accepted by other vehicles and thereby mislead them,
or to track other vehicles. For example, let us consider a
case when a vehicle wants to go from A to B. There are
two roads connecting A and B: highway X and highway
Y. An adversary may try to announce and convince
others that highway X is very congested. As a result,
other vehicles may go through highway Y instead. At
the end, highway X is empty. The adversary may get
advantage of this false announcement.
Another aim of the adversary is to pretend it is in
location A at time t1 while actually it is in location
B at time t2 . By providing a false location and
time information, other vehicles may be misled by the
adversary. It may then gain advantage from it.
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FIGURE 2: The Concept of Accuracy Index

3.4.

Assumptions

We first assume that a vehicle is equipped with a
tamper-resistant black box. We note that this is a
common practice in VANET protocol design [33, 22, 11].
This black box has protection for the secure storage
of secrets and a component which can perform basic
cryptographic operations securely. We assume it will
always operate correctly according to the algorithm,
and will never disclose its secrets.
We also assume that there is a system issuer, or
an authority, which has its own secret key and the
corresponding system parameter is available to all
vehicles and charging stations. Each announcement can
be verified by using the system parameter.
In addition, we assume that the charging station is
trusted. It will only issue a credential to a EV if and
only if the EV genuinely recharge for an amount that is
higher than a certain threshold. This is to prevent any
EV from obtaining multiple credentials through many
small-amount recharges.
We further assume that our system is immune
to any kind of physical security attack (e.g. any
attack within the physical layer, or any physical attack
against entities), side-channel attack (that is, any
attack based on information gained from the physical
implementation of a system, rather than brute force or
theoretical weaknesses in the algorithms) or denial-ofservice attack. We consider these attacks are out of the
scope of this paper.

4.

OUR PROPOSED SYSTEM

We now give a detailed description of our proposed
AAS system. Our scheme consists of the following
protocols: Setup, Certify, Re-Charge, Sign, Verify and
Accuracy Calculation.
Setup creates the system secret key which should
be stored by some authorities and public parameters.
Certify allows each charging station to register with the
authority to provide charging service. Re-charge allows
users to re-charge their vehicles and get the token used
for authenticating their announcement. Sign signs an
announcement anonymously using the token obtained
from charging station. Verify verifies a signature.
Accuracy Calculation calculates the overall accuracy
based on the information of different messages received.
4.1.

Cryptographic Primitives

We made use of two basic cryptographic primitives,
namely, digital signatures and identity-based signatures
(IBS) [41]. Indeed, it has been shown in [1] that the
former implies the latter and thus it is safe to say our
construction is based on well-established primitive from
cryptography.
4.2.

Concrete Construction

We employ the IBS due to Liu et al.[26] and the
standard Schnorr Signature [39] since both of them
are efficient and more importantly, support precomputation.
•

Setup: Let k be a security parameter. Let G = hgi
be a cyclic group of prime order p such that p is

Anonymous Announcement System (AAS) for Electric Vehicle in VANETs
TABLE 1: Location Factor

of length k. The authority (e.g. transportation
department) selects a random number x ∈R Zp
and computes X = g x . It chooses a collisionresistant hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗p . The
public parameters param and the master secret key
msk are given by
param = (G, g, p, X, H)
•

•

msk = x

–

Offline Phase. The charging station randomly
picks y ∈R Z∗p and computes Y = g y . The
user randomly picks u ∈R Z∗p and computes
U = gu .
Online Phase. This phase happens when
the user re-charge at the charging station at
time time. The user sends U to the charging
station, who computes h = H(Y ||R||U ||time)7
and z = y + hs mod p. The charging station
returns (Y, R, z) to the user. User stores the
token (ID, Loc, time, Y, R, z, U, u). Note that
the user could validate the token by checking
g z = Y (RX H(R||ID||Loc) )H(Y ||R||U ||time) .

Sign: Again, the user can conduct pre-computation
when its CPU is idle.
–
–

Offline Phase. The user randomly picks v ∈R
Z∗p and computes V = g v .
Online Phase.
To create a signature
on announcement m, the user with token
(ID, Loc, time, Y, R, z, U, u, V, v) computes c =
H(ID||Loc||time||U ||V ||m) and w = v −
cu mod p. Output the signature as
σ = (ID, Loc, time, Y, R, z, U, c, w)

•

Verify:
To verify a signature σ on announcement m, the verifier first parse σ as
(ID, Loc, time, Y, R, z, U, c, w). He/she computes
h = H(Y ||R||U ||time). Next, it outputs accept if
and only if
g

z

h

hH(R||ID||Loc)

= YR X
c = H(ID||Loc||time||U ||U c g w ||m)

7 We remark that the time time is specified by the charging
station. We do not assume a complete synchronisation of time
over the VANET.

Factor
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%

TABLE 2: Time Factor
Time Difference
0 - 10 minutes
10.01 - 20 minutes
20.01 - 30 minutes
30.01 - 40 minutes
40.01 - 50 minutes
more than 50 minutes

s = r + H(R||ID||Loc)x mod p

The key of this charging station is (R, s).
Re-Charge: To speed up things, the protocol is
divided into two phases. In the off-line phase,
both charging station and the user can perform precomputation without knowing anything about the
re-charge process about to take place. Thus, the
idle CPU time can be utilized effectively.
–

•

Location Difference
0 - 10 km
10.01 - 20 km
20.01 - 30 km
30.01 - 40 km
40.01 - 50 km
more than 50 km

Certify: Let ID ∈ {0, 1}k be the identifier of a
charging station located at location Loc ∈ {0, 1}k .
The authority selects r ∈R Z∗p and computes
R = gr

7

•

Factor
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%

Accuracy Calculation:
We use an index, called Accuracy Index, to define
the accuracy of each message. The index is divided
into two parts:
1.

2.

The first part corresponds to the location and
time differences between the previous visited
charging station and the reported incident.
The second part corresponds to the location
and time differences between the reported
incident and the receiver.

The initial value of each part is set to be 1.
A location factor and a time factor will be
multiplied to it, according to the differences of
the location and time respectively. The factors
can be defined according to different scenarios and
environments. Here we just give an example for
defining factors, which are presented in table 1
and 2. We remark that this can be adjusted
easily without affecting the technical part.
The adjustment can be done according to
different situations. We do not cover this
part in the scope of this paper.
After multiplying, the two partial indices will be
added up together. Thus the final index will be
from 0 to 2. 0 represents the message is very
inaccurate, while 2 represents the message is very
accurate. For messages sent from non-EV, as there
is no authenticated location and time information,
we give a medium value for those messages. This
“value bar” is shown in Figure 3.
We use an example to illustrate how it works.
–

After being re-charged at 1pm, a vehicle
passed through a location at 1:15pm which is
5 km away from the charging station. There
was an accident and traffic jam in that road.
At 1:40pm, it arrived at a location which is
13 km away from the accident and it sent
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FIGURE 3: Overall accuracy index

a broadcast message telling nearby vehicles
about this accident.
∗ The first part of the accuracy index is
calculated as follow. As the location
difference is 5 km (between the charging
station and the accident), the location
factor should be 100%. As the time
difference is 15 minutes, the time factor
should be 80%. Thus the first part of
the accuracy index should be 1 × 100% ×
80% = 0.8.
∗ The second part of the accuracy index
is calculated as follow. As the location
difference is 13 km (between the accident
and the receiver), the location factor
should be 80%. As the time difference
is 25 minutes, the time factor should
be 60%. Thus the second part of the
accuracy index should be 1×80%×60% =
0.48.
∗ The final accuracy index of this message
should be 0.8 + 0.48 = 1.28.
The above example shows how to calculate the
accuracy index for one message. The vehicle also
needs to collect a number of messages for the final
calculation. Upon received n valid messages, it
first discards any repeated messages (sent from the
same vehicle) by checking whether any two or more
messages containing the same U . Then it adds up
the accuracy indexes of all remaining messages. If
the final value is above a threshold (e.g. above 10),
it decides to believe that the information is true.
We also note that these parameter values (e.g.
location factor, time factor, overall threshold
value) can be adjusted according to different
environments. For example, the following formula
is used in [20]: a factor of α is given to the first
observer of an incident, and the nodes d hops away
from the observer is given a factor of αd . In this
paper, we just provide an example showing how to
apply our scheme to the actual scenario.
5.

SECURITY ANALYSIS

We informally show that our Anonymous Announcement System (AAS) for Electric Vehicle in VANETs
provides reliability and privacy. Following our ac-

curacy calculation formula and a threshold of 10,
each announcement m endorsed by a signature
(ID, Loc, time, Y, R, z, U, c, w) can have an accuracy index of at most 2. To trick a vehicle into believing an
announcement, at least five signatures whose value U
are distinct are required.
Note that the tuple (Y, R, z) is an identity-based
signature on U ||time under the identity ID||Loc. The
tuple (c, w) is a Schnorr signature under the public
key U . Due to the unforgeability of both signature
schemes, it is impossible for any attacker to create
an announcement with a new U value without having
recharged at station ID in location Loc at time time.
Thus, to trick a vehicle into believing an announcement,
collusion of five vehicles is needed.
On one hand, privacy guarantee is straightforward
since there is no common identifier for a vehicle across
each recharge. Every time the vehicle chooses a new
u and compute U = g u , which is unrelated to the
value U in the previous re-charge. On the other hand,
announcement made by the vehicle using the same U
is by default linkable so as to prevent a malicious from
posting multiple announcements to affect the decision
of others.
6.
6.1.

PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
Performance of our scheme

We analyse the performance of our scheme. The
implementation was done on a testbed of Lenovo
X200s with an Intel Core 2 Duo CPU L9400, 4GB
Ram running Windows 7. The software library is
MIRACL version 5.2. The code is C and the developing
environment is Visual C++ 2008 Express Edition. We
use SHA-1 as the hash function 8 . We measured the
performance using a 192-bit secret key in elliptic curve
cryptosystem (ECC). It is generally believed that a 192bit secret key in ECC provides stronger security than a
1024-bit key in RSA [38].
The curve we choose is the curve P-192, one of the
curves over prime fields recommended by NIST.9 The
curve is defined by
ŷ 2 = x̂3 − 3x̂ + b̂ mod p̂,
where b̂ is taken to be 64210519 e59c80e7 0f a7e9ab
72243049 f eb8deec c146b9b1 (in hexadecimal) and
p̂ = 62771017 35386680 76383578 94232076 66416083
90870039 0324961279 (in decimal). The generator
g is at the coordinate (188da80e b03090f 6 7cbf 20eb
43a18800 f 4f f 0af d 82f f 1012, 07192b95 f f c8da78
8 We remark that in order to enhance the security, SHA-1 can
be replaced by a stronger hash function, e.g. SHA-256 or SHA3256. But for the purpose of this simulation, we simply use SHA-1.
Therefore we remark for this security adjustment if the proposed
system is deployed in the practical world.
9 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips186-3/fips 1863.pdf
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TABLE 3: Performance of the AAS

Setup
Certify
Re-Charge

Sign

Verify

Process
Without file I/O
Include file I/O
Without file I/O
Include file I/O
Server (Offline)
User (Offline)
Server (Online)
Include file I/O of
both user and server
User (Offline)
User (Online)
Include file I/O
Without file I/O
Include file I/O

Running Time (ms)
2.658
5.6
2.904
5.152
3.39
2.795
0.112

•

•

•

•

Process
Setup (parameter)
(master secret key)
Certify (charging station storage)
Re-Charge (user storage)
Sign (signature size)

2.735
0.074
4.344
10.628
12.078

EV setup. Read the curve data from common.ecs
into memory, output the public key and private
of the authority to public.ecs and private.ecs
respectively.
EV certify ID Loc. Read curve data and key
data from common.ecs and private.ecs, output the
private key of the charging station of identifier ID
at location Loc to the file ID Loc.key.
EV re-charge ID Loc. Read curve data and key data
from common.ecs and ID Loc.key, output the token
for the user to the file IDLoc.token. The time time
is also stored inside the token file. This function
conducts both off-line and on-line computation for
the user and the charging station. The value
U computed at the user side is first stored as a
temporary file, and read in by the program again
to simulate the process of transmitting U from the
user to the charging station.
EV sign token name m. Read curve data and
token data from common.ecs and token name.token,
output the signature on message m for the user to
the file IDLoc.sig. The value of m and time are also
stored in the file.
EV verify sig file. Read curve data, public key of
the authority from common.ecs and public.ecs. Also
obtain the m, ID, Loc, time, and the signature from
sig file and output accept or reject.

We summarize our performance in table 3.
We also summarize the output length of each process
in table 4. Here we assume the length of ID (the
10 Source code and executables are available to the editors upon
request.

Length (bytes)
72
24
48
420
444

TABLE 5: Comparison of Functionalities

15.4

631011ed 6b24cdd5 73f 977a1 1e794811) (in hexadecimal) and has an order p = 62771017 35386680 76383578
94231760 59013767 19477318 2842284081.
Our implementation is a simple prototype that
supports the following five functions. Input and output
are read from, and write to, local file directly. The curve
parameter is stored in a text file (common.ecs) 10 .
•

TABLE 4: Length of output

Entity Authentication
Location Authentication
Anonymity
Distinguishability of
source of origin
Unlinkability
Threshold
Revocation

TAA-1
X
×
X

TAA-2
X
×
X

Our Scheme
X
X
X

X

X

X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X∗
X
×

identifier of a charging station), Loc (the location
information of a charging station) and time (the current
time of the re-charge) to be 100 bytes each.
We note that if we reduce the length of ID, Loc and
time, the length of user storage in Re-Charge and the
signature size in Sign can be significantly reduced. Here
we use 100 bytes as we provide flexibility for different
applications.
6.2.

Comparison with other schemes

In this section, we compare our AAS with the most
relevant schemes, the TAA schemes [11]11 . Specifically,
we conduct our comparison in terms of functionalities
and computational cost.
In table 5, we compare the schemes by considering the
following functionalities, namely entity authentication
12
, location authentication, anonymity, distinguishability of source of origin (whether one vehicle sending multiple messages pretending they are coming from different vehicles), unlinkability (whether a verifier can link a
vehicle from two different messages for different events),
threshold (the accuracy is determined by a threshold
number of vehicles, instead of from one single vehicle)
and revocation. We can see that our scheme is similar to
the TAA schemes. The main difference is the location
authentication which is not provided in their schemes,
and revocation is not supported in our scheme. We remark that unlinkability is guaranteed when a node only
make one announcement per re-charge.
In table 6, we compare the computational cost. We
use E to denote an exponentiation and P to denote a
pairing operation. We only compare Sign and Verify
11 In their paper, there are two schemes. We use TAA-1 and
TAA-2 to denote.
12 We remark that EV authentication (the recharging station
checks whether an EV is legitimate or not) can be done by other
mechanism such as [4]. Readers may refer to [4] for more details.
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[hbtp]

TABLE 6: Comparison of Computational Cost
Sign
Verify

TAA-1
6E + 1P
5E + 5P

TAA-2
9E + 1P
8E + 5P

Operation System
C compiler
Simulator
Packets Handling
Moment Handling

Our Scheme
1E
5E

Ubuntu 12.04
g++ 4.7.2
ns2 2.35
VanetRBC
RTMM

TABLE 7: software environment of our
implementation

as these are the only common processes between these
schemes.
Pairing is an expensive computation operation.
According to [40], one pairing evaluation takes at least 7
times slower than an exponentiation. Our scheme does
not require any pairing operation. Thus our scheme
is very efficient in terms of computational cost, when
compared to the TAA schemes.
6.3.

Network Simulation

6.3.1. Configuration of the testbed
To evaluate the performance of our scheme when it
is deployed on top of a VANET, we implement our
scheme using the network simulator ns2 [30]. We use
the VANET-Skeleton for ns2 (VanetRBC) library [21]
for packets transmitting and the Random Trip Mobility
Model (RTTM) [32] for the vehicular movement. Table
7 gives more details on the software environment of our
implementation.
The VanetRBC is an ns2 module to handle packet
transmission in VANET. In addition, we defined our
own AAS package based on VanetRBC where the
major differences between the two are the size of the
packets and the cryptographic delay to process the
package. Those two data are obtained from our previous
implementation of the scheme. Further, to allow some
randomness in the simulation, we randomly choose a
number between 15 and 20ms which refers to the time
a package is signed, compared with 12.078ms in our
previous implementation. We assume that the VANET
traffic is 1 package per node per second. In comparison,
the AAS packet will be broadcast one time only by the
nodes close to the incident. We remark that there may
be more than one package describing the incident from
different source nodes. However, those packages are
treated as different VANET packages.
For simplicity, we assume that the transmitting delay
is a constant value, and the transmission is always
successful with this delay, as long as two nodes are
within the transmitting range. Detail setting of the two
packages are listed in Table 8.

Transmitting Range
Transmitting Delay
Transmitting Interval
Package Size
Package Rate
Cryptographic Delay

VanetRBC
300 meters
100 ms
300 ms
250Byte
1 per node per second
0

AAS package
300 meters
100 ms
300 ms
500Byte
1 time only
15 ∼ 20 ms

TABLE 8: Configuration for nodes

The movements of the nodes in our implementation
follow the random waypoint model as defined in the
RTTM [32], which is one of the most popular mobility
models. In this model, each node will be assigned
with a series of waypoints that are uniformly randomly
chosen. The movement of a certain node will follow its
waypoints. At each waypoint, the node will randomly
chose a velocity to move towards the next waypoint. We
remark that this is somewhat a standardized mobility
model to evaluate performance of ad-hoc network
protocols due to its simplicity and wide availability.
6.4.

Simulation Settings

The goal of the simulation are two-folded. Firstly,
we would like to know the overhead if our system is
implemented on top of an existing VANET. Secondly,
we would like to know how long it takes for a message
to reach all the nodes within the network. We test our
scheme in three different scenarios. The first scenario
corresponds to a medium sized area (25X25km2 ) where
the nodes are sparsely distributed. The second and
third scenarios are for a larger area (30X30km2 ). The
main difference between these two scenarios are the
vehicle density. Details of the scenarios are given in
Table 9.
We conduct simulations for each scenario on a classic
VANET with and without including our system. The
steps are described below.
•

•

•

•

We firstly simulate a pure VANET, where the
network traffic are generated by each node as per
configuration.
Then, to observe the influence of our scheme, at
certain time point (i.e., 100 second), we randomly
choose a point in the map13 , where all nodes that
are close (i.e. within 1 km) to this point will be
chosen as the source nodes and broadcast a packet.
We remark again that each note will sign on their
packets, hence, although all packets are describing
a same incident, they are different packets.
To minimize the influence of randomness, we run
the above simulation for 10 times, each time with
a new seed for random generator.
Lastly, we compare the overall traffic of a pure
VANET and a VANET incorporating our scheme.

13 This is achieved by randomly choose x and y coordinator in
the map.
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Size of Area
Number of Nodes
Velocity
Simulation time
Incident time

Scenario 1
Medium Area
25 × 25km2
50
1 ∼ 10m/s
500 seconds
100 second

Scenario 2
Large Area
30 × 30km2
125
1 ∼ 20m/s
500 seconds
100 second

Scenario 3
Large Area
30 × 30km2
350
1 ∼ 20m/s
500 seconds
100 second

TABLE 9: Details of the Scenarios

6.4.1. Results
The results are shown in Figures 4, 5 and 6. It can
be observed that as the density of the nodes increases,
the throughput per each node becomes more stable.
From the result of the last scenario, we can see that
the average throughput is around 2.7 kbits per second.
Our AAS packets only affect the throughput by no
more than 1 kbits per second, when the number of nodes
is small. When there are more nodes in the VANET,
on average, the affect of AAS packets becomes less
important, increasing the average throughput by less
than 0.2 kbits per second. It can be concluded that our
system does not affect the throughput of the system in
a significant manner.
For all the scenarios, it can be observed that the AAS
packet cannot be found after 100 seconds of the time
following the occurrence of the incident occurs. In other
words, the messages reaches all nodes in the network in
around 100s.
It is quite nature since the AAS packets are generated
one time only, compared with VANET packet. Indeed,
it means that all users in this VANET are aware of the
incident within 100 seconds using our method.
7.

CONCLUSION

In this paper, we presented an Anonymous Announcement System for EV in VANETs. Our scheme allows an
EV to make authenticated and anonymous announcement, by making use of the “short driving range” property of EV. We turn this disadvantage into a way to
provide authentication of location and time. Accuracy
of the received message can be increased. Our scheme
is very efficient. Our performance analysis and implementation result show that most operations can be done
within a few milliseconds. This is due to the avoidance
of the expensive pairing operation.
Future work may include giving rigorous proofs to
the security of the proposed system. Another challenge
is to explore the possibility to incorporate roadside
infrastructure for tracing and revocation purposes.
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